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INDIVIDUAL AND COMMUNITY: AN APPRECIATION OF
MR. JUSTICE POWELL
ChristinaB. Whitman*

W

HEN the nomination of Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to the Supreme
Court of the United States was submitted to the Senate Judiciary Committee ten years ago, much was made of his extraordinary record of service to his city, his state, and his profession.1 Justice Powell's career has been a model of individual responsibility to
society. His belief in the value of civic life, and in the desirability
of making such a life available to everyone, has been a dominant
influence in his work on the Supreme Court. In what follows, I
shall attempt to define some of the assumptions with which Powell
appears to approach the problems-largely constitutional-that
have come before him as a Justice. A theme can be discerned: Powell's jurisprudence emphasizes the individual, but not the individual in isolation. Rather, it emphasizes the communal aspects of individual life, the expression of human variety through community.
Justice Powell does not define the individual only, or even primarily, in terms of rights against other people or against government. Rather, he is concerned at least as much with the public life
of a person, with responsibilities to institutions, to family, and to
neighbors. These themes emerge most clearly in Justice Powell's
views of federal-state relations, where he takes pains to preserve
the more accessible forms of government, and in his conception of
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Michigan. I would like to thank Susan Block,
of the University of Michigan class of 1982, for her care and criticism and friendship
through the preparation of this article.
The author clerked for Justice Powell during 1975-76. The views attributed to the Justice
in this article are derived entirely from a reading of his opinions, but this reading was necessarily informed by the experience of working for one year in the discipline and warmth of
that uniquely collegial chambers. Justice Powell's fairness, his honesty, and his inexhaustible concern for people are apparent to all who have had the opportunity to meet him,

although his clerks and his family may be the primary beneficiaries of these qualities. We
who have worked with him may be best aware of other characteristics: his willingness to
listen to argument as long as argument is made, his unceasing desire to learn, and his tolerance of frailty. He is a splendid man.
' See, e.g., Nominations of William H. Rehnquist and Lewis F. Powell, Jr.: Hearings
Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Seas. 88-90, 115, 123, 129, 132-33,
135 (1971) (statements of Hon. William B. Spong, Jr., A.E. Dick Howard, J. Edward Lumbard, Bernard G. Segal, Hicks Epton, and Phil C. Neal).
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the proper role of a judge. A judge, he believes, has a proper place
only as a protector of individual rights, not as an expounder of
broad principles or a general overseer of the quality of official conduct. And those rights with which judges properly are concerned
should be defined with particularity and with sensitivity to opposing interests, including the interests of other individuals. The variety of human social organizations and the importance of these organizations to a rich and complete human life mean that judges
must step cautiously even within their sphere of authority. Caution
is important not only because these organizations are worth preserving, but also because judges are limited in their ability to understand and affect particular institutions through rules of general
application.
Justice Powell introduced his concern for community autonomy
and its importance to the individual in one of the first opinions he
authored as a Supreme Court Justice.2 In subsequent opinions, this
theme is played out in Justice Powell's concern with federal-state
relations and with the proper role of a judge.
I. THE Keyes

OPINION: AN INTRODUCTION TO COMMUNITY VALUES

Shortly after he assumed his seat on the Court, Justice Powell
wrote a separate opinion that was a remarkably personal introduction to the values and approach of the new Justice. The case was
Keyes v. School District No. 1s In that opinion, a majority of the
Court accepted a distinction between de facto and de jure discrimination for the purpose of determining when a school board has violated the command of Brown v. Board of Education.4 Justice Powell's opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in part, took a
position that has not been characteristic of his work-he stood virtually alone in arguing for an expansion of constitutional protection. 5 The opinion is also remarkable in that Justice Powell spoke
2

Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 217 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring in part and

dissenting in part).
3 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
4 347 U.S. 483 (1954). See 413 U.S. at 208.
5 Justice Powell rejected the de facto/de jure distinction and held instead that a prima
facie constitutional violation exists whenever there is evidence that segregated schools exist
to a substantial degree within a system. 413 U.S. at 224 (Powell, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). In Justice Powell's view, his approach is preferable because in the context of school segregation, it is essential to "formulate constitutional principles of national
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quite openly as a southerner. He argued that the majority's distinction is unacceptable because it, in effect, treats school segregation as a problem unique to the South.'
The Keyes opinion is most important-and more typical of Justice Powell's work-for the insight that it gives into the role that
community values play in Powell's thinking. It also illustrates the
qualities that would best characterize his subsequent work on the
Court-restraint and a reluctance to adopt all-inclusive solutions.
These characteristics are related. As I shall indicate, it is the need
to promote variety and strength in local communities that leads
Justice Powell to caution in proposing judicial solutions.
The centrality of community values and the concern for judicial
caution are most clearly illustrated in those parts of the Keyes
opinion where Justice Powell discussed busing as a remedy for the
effects of segregation. Powell began by arguing that "equitable
remedies must be approached" with an "even-handed spirit,"
avoiding "[o]verzealousness in pursuit of any single goal."'7 He then
elaborated at some length upon the elements that a district judge
should consider in drafting a desegregation decree. These are not
limited to constitutional, or even strictly legal matters. Instead,
Justice Powell tried to articulate what might most trouble ordinary
citizens who would be affected by the decrees. The opinion emphasizes the disruptive effects of busing-perhaps because Powell
could not avoid viewing the problem from the perspective of a
school board member and a parent, perhaps because he felt that
the interests in favor of desegregation are too obvious to require
restatement at length. But the tone and the approach indicate an
effort to grapple with both sides of the problem.
Justice Powell attempted to be as honest as possible about the

rather than merely regional application." Id. at 219. In other opinions where the cost to
constitutional values is not, in his view, so high, it is precisely the national nature of consti-

tutional principles that leads him to argue that the Constitution should be read narrowly.
See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 176 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell & Stevens,

JJ.); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 462 (1972) (Powell, J., dissenting).
'

Powell disapproved of the de facto/de jure distinction because it would mean that

school boards in the South, but not those in the North, would be required to respond to a
problem they both share. Segregated schools in urban areas everywhere, he insisted, are due
fundamentally to segregated residential and migratory patterns rather than to state-

imposed segregation: "This is a national, not a southern, phenomenon." 413 U.S. at 223
(Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 240.
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considerations that influence his view. He directly addressed the
desire of parents to retain a voice in the school their children attend, the need for community, the fear that long hours of busing
will affect the quality of life of young children, and the financial
drain on public schools. Characteristically, Justice Powell's conclusion was not a definite rule for general application. Instead, primary responsibility for decision in specific cases is entrusted to the
lower courts." Justice Powell's purpose in articulating the competing interests was to give the lower courts guidance, not to preempt
their conclusions. This deference to lower courts is essential because Justice Powell sees the judiciary as an institution best
equipped to resolve particular disputes-and it does this most successfully by focusing on the details of each case, on the interests
that are really at stake for the individuals and the community actually involved.'
Powell's desire to encourage individuals to express their interests
through community institutions is apparent in his recognition and
articulation of the interests described above. It is also apparent in
his emphasis on the importance of those nonconstitutional tasks
that are typically the concern of state and local government. 10
"[T]he foremost goal of any school system," he wrote, is not desegregation, but "the best quality education for all pupils."1 Desegregation, he reminded the Court, is but a means to that end. Powell
also recognized the practical constraints faced by those who run
local institutions-their need for flexibility, for funds, and for community and parental support. 12 Finally, Powell took pains to stress

the individual's ties to his local governing institutions. In elaborating on the importance of support for public education, he offered a
remarkable description of local government as an arena for personal involvement:
Community support, interest, and dedication to public schools may
well run higher with a neighborhood attendance pattern: distance
may encourage disinterest. Many citizens sense today a decline in
the intimacy of our institutions-home, church, and school" Id. at 241.
" Id. at 251.

10 Id. at 240.

11Id. at 242.
12

Id. at 245-51.
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which has caused a concomitant decline in the unity and communal spirit of our people. I pass no judgment on this viewpoint, but I
do believe that this Court should be wary of compelling in the
name of constitutional law what may seem to many a dissolution in
the traditional, more personal fabric of their public schools. 1
The key to understanding much of Justice Powell's
work-despite his faint disclaimer in the quote above-lies in his
desire to encourage and preserve this strong personal tie between
each individual and the institutions that directly affect his life.
Powell simply is not ready to give up on this ideal and join those
who stress the mass nature of twentieth-century society. It is an
ideal that he finds at the core of the structures created by the Constitution. In questions of federalism this means, among other
things, that the lower levels of government, those most accessible
to influence by individuals, should be sufficiently strong, in terms
of manpower, funds, and scope of authority, to allow the citizen
who chooses to play a political role some real measure of control
over those issues that are likely to matter most to him. In questions of the exercise of judicial authority, the ideal means that a
judge should avoid broad solutions that respond to group problems
but ignore other consequences to individual and community life.
It is his perspective on the importance of an individual's involvement in the community that enables Justice Powell to combine an
individual-oriented jurisprudence with a commitment to judicial
restraint. Unlike many contemporary jurists, Powell'does not define personal fulfillment wholly, or even primarily, in terms of the
exercise of rights standing in opposition to the claims of society.
On the contrary, Powell appears to view a person as most fully
human in his civic life, in fulfilling obligations rather than asserting rights. Indeed, Powell stresses, an individual's interests typically grow out of such obligations as, for example, in Keyes, a parent's concern for the education of his child. The established social
structure of a community, even a region of the country, may provide a context in which people define themselves as firmly through
communal bonds as through any independent sense of self.
This understanding of the individual in terms of his obligations
lies at the core of Justice Powell's judicial conservatism. It is essen13

Id. at 246 (emphasis added).
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tial that, while protecting rights, a judge also take pains to preserve those bonds that connect people. 14 In the name of vindicating
human rights, the national government, and particularly its judges,
should not destroy those things that matter most to many people.
Justice Powell's concern not to disturb unnecessarily the functioning of institutions is most obvious in those opinions, like
Keyes, that involve education. For example, in Ingraham v.
Wright,"5 Justice Powell, writing for the Court, rejected a constitutional challenge to corporal punishment in public schools. Because
public schools are "open" institutions, Powell wrote, they can be
supervised by the community. Therefore, students, unlike, for example, prisoners,1e have "little need for the protection of the
Eighth Amendment,"1 and the safeguards that the common law
provides are sufficient to meet the requirements of procedural due
process.1 8 Similarly, in his dissent in Goss v. Lopez,1 9 Powell exThat Justice Powell's respect for community autonomy stems from the community's
role in preserving traditional bonds is evidenced by his willingness to strike down local determinations that sever those bonds. In Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977)
(plurality opinion), Powell, writing on behalf of a plurality of the Court, struck down a local
zoning ordinance that prohibited a grandmother from living with her son and two grandsons; he concluded that such an ordinance runs afoul of the substantive due process standards of the fourteenth amendment. Justice Powell stated quite clearly his view that the
Constitution was designed to protect and preserve particular social traditions:
Appropriate limits on substantive due process come not from drawing arbitrary
lines but rather from careful "respect for the teachings of history [and] solid recognition of the basic values that underlie our society." . . . Our decisions establish that
the Constitution protects the sanctity of the family precisely because the institution
of the family is deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition. It is through the
family that we inculcate and pass down many of our most cherished values, moral
and cultural.
Id. at 503-04 (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 501 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment)). Justice Powell went on to say: "Ours is by no means a tradition
limited to respect for the bonds uniting the members of the nuclear family. The tradition of
uncles, aunts, cousins, and especially grandparents sharing a household along with parents
and children has roots equally venerable and equally deserving of constitutional recognition." Id. at 504. Thus, the Court's obligation under the Constitution is to ensure that government does not intrude upon those who live according to this tradition. Similar protection
is not provided to living arrangements of unrelated individuals, for these lack deep roots in
American culture. Id. at 498 (distinguishing Village of Belle Terre v. Boras, 416 U.S. 1
(1974)).
-5430 U.S. 651 (1977).
:6 Id. at 669-70.
7 Id. at 670.
Id. at 672, 678.
' 419 U.S. 565, 584 (1975) (Powell, J., dissenting).
14
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pressed his belief that the majority of the Court erred when it focused on the rights of students against their teacher or the state.
Instead, he argued, the state's interests and the pupil's interests
are congruent. It is in the student's interest to accept the teacher's
authority, to learn respect for the rights of others. In arguing this
point, Justice Powell was not afraid to be very personal. He recalled "warm memories of our teachers, 20 contrasting that to the
majority's approach, which, Powell said, introduces into the
schoolroom that "faceless" "conflict of interests" found in the
"competitive and adversary environment of the adult, commercial
21
world."
Justice Powell's respect for institutional autonomy has not been
limited to public schools and other local organizations. In Schlesinger v. Councilman,22 for example, Powell held against judicial interference in military courts-martial. He stressed that the military
is "a specialized society separate from civilian society," a society in
which a premium is appropriately placed on respect for duty and
on a special level of discipline. 23 In Cannon v. University of Chicago,2 4 Powell dissented from the majority's conclusion that a private cause of action based on alleged sex discrimination in admissions to medical school could be implied under title IX of the
Education Act Amendments of 1972.25 Justice Powell refused to
read the statute more broadly than was absolutely necessary. He
asserted that title IX "trenches on the authority of the academic
community to govern itself, an authority the free exercise of which
is critical to the vitality of our society. '26 In both cases, important
national interests arguably supported institutional autonomy-military preparedness in Schlesinger, academic freedom in
Cannon-but Justice Powell's concern for this autonomy also reflects his desire to preserve a variety of frameworks in which an
individual can find a community that shares his own values and in
10Id. at 594 n.12.
21 Id. at 594-95 n.13.
420 U.S. 738 (1975).
Id. at 757 (quoting Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743 (1974)).
24 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
22
13

,5Id. at 730 (Powell, J., dissenting). See Education Act Amendments, § 901(a), Pub. L.
No. 92-318, 86 Stat. 235 (1972).
"1 441 U.S. at 747 (citing, inter alia, Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,
311 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.)).
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which he can play a significant role.
That judges should be reluctant to disturb community bonds in
the name of vindicating constitutional rights does not mean, for
Justice Powell, that individuals do not remain paramount. Communities should be protected because of their importance to the
individuals who create them, but neither courts nor communities
may sacrifice even one person for the collective good. This determination that the individual is of ultimate importance is most evident in Justice Powell's persistent refusal to remedy wrongs by imposing burdens upon innocent people. An early version of this
principle appears in Keyes, where Powell argued that wide-scale
busing is troublesome because it does not burden the local school
officials who committed constitutional wrongs, but rather "children
and parents who did not participate in any constitutional
'27
violation.
In Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co.,2 8 that principle led
Powell to dissent from the majority's decision to approve a form of
class relief (retroactive seniority) at the expense of those who are
"not the wrongdoers who have no claim to the Chancellor's conscience, but rather are innocent third parties. '29 Powell was cold to
the argument that the seniority expectations of white workers are
illegitimate because they are based on past discrimination in hiring
by the employer.
Acceptance of the job when offered hardly makes one an accessory
to a discriminatory failure to hire someone else .... [T]he incumbent's expectancy does not result from discrimination against
others, but is based on his own efforts and satisfactory
30
performance.
Despite his general deference to more representative branches,
Powell also is willing to challenge legislative decisions that ignore
individual claims in furtherance of social progress. In his opinion
in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,3 1 Powell reiterated that "there is a measure of inequity in forcing innocent persons ... to bear the burdens of redressing grievances not of their
27 413 U.S. at 250 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
28

424 U.S. 747 (1976).

2 Id. at 789 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
30 Id. at 788-89 n.7.

"1438 U.S. 265 (1978).

HeinOnline -- 68 Va. L. Rev. 310 1982

Individual and Community

1982]

making.""2 He emphasized that absent a violation of the Constitution or a statute, "it cannot be said that the government has any
greater interest in helping one individual than in refraining from
harming another."3 3 Although he ultimately approved affirmative
action to attain a diverse student body, Justice Powell rejected the
California program because it insulated minorities from competition with other applicants. It is possible to achieve diversity, he
argued, without violating an applicant's constitutional "right to individualized considerationwithout regard to his race."'" This is a
right Powell derived from sources that run even deeper than the
Constitution: "Fairness in individual competition for opportunities
. . . is a widely cherished American ethic. Indeed, in a broader
sense, an underlying assumption of the rule of law is the worthiness of a system of justice based on fairness to the individual."3 5
II.

COMMUNITY AND THE

DEMOCRATIC PROCESS

Justice Powell has been a consistent advocate of minimizing federal interference in state and local government.3 6 Yet, it bears repeating, the preservation of local and regional communities is not,
for him, an end in itself. Rather, it is important in large part because, in contrast to the national government, those communities
still provide an arena for the exercise of individual influence. Individual influence is important both because civic involvement is essential to personal growth and because individual interests are best
protected by a government in which the voice of each citizen can
be heard.
Lower-level government will continue to play this role only if it
continues to attract intelligent and caring people and remains open
to all citizens, not just to lawyers. A primary reason for Justice
Powell's opposition to the expansion of liability for state and local
offices has been his fear that government service will become safe
only for those who are experts in the law.3 7 In Wood v. Strick31

Id. at 298 (opinion of Powell, J.).

Id. at 308-09.
Id. at 318 n.52 (emphasis added).
' Id. at 319 n.53.
' For a very recent statement of this view, see Justice Powell's concurrence in Parratt v.
Taylor, 101 S. Ct. 1908, 1918 (1981) (Powell, J., concurring in the result).
37Justice Powell brings a personal fervor to the concern that lower-level government remain attractive, that it provide status and power to those who serve. Even prior to his ap-
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land,38 he dissented from the majority's conclusion that local
school officials are entitled to only a qualified immunity from damage liability. The majority held that immunity could be lost if the
official "knew or reasonably should have known that the action he
took within his sphere of official responsibility would violate the
constitutional rights of the student affected,"3 9 a standard that
Justice Powell characterized as "appear[ing] to rest on an unwarranted assumption as to what lay school officials know or can know
about the law and constitutional rights. ' 40 School boards, he reminded the Court, are drawn-and, he implied, should be
drawn-from citizens who have "no unique competency in divining
'4 1
the law."
Powell's concern goes beyond his fear that the threat of federal
litigation will make public service too treacherous for the nonlawyer. He is also afraid that local government jobs will become so
fraught with such threats and, because of "pervasive judicial oversight," so devoid of real authority that even lawyers will be unwilling to serve. In Maine v. Thiboutot,4 2 for example, Justice Powell
disagreed emphatically with the majority's interpretation that section 198343 allowed private actions against state and local officials
for violations of federal statutes. 4 He described this interpretation
as a "new intrusion into state sovereignty"'45 and expressed the fear

pointment to the Supreme Court, Justice Powell was able to combine his technical expertise
as a lawyer with considerable political influence as an individual. Justice Powell has served
as Chairman of the Richmond Public School Board (1952-61), as President of the Virginia
Board of Education, as a member of the state Constitutional Revision Committee, as a
member of the National Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice
(1965), and as a member of President Nixon's Blue Ribbon Defense Panel (1969). His participation in professional societies was even more extensive. He has served as President of
the American Bar Association (1964-65), as President of the American College of Trial Lawyers (1969-70), and as President of the American Bar Foundation (1969-71). Lawyers are in
a unique position to exercise influence of this sort, as Justice Powell would be eager to
acknowledge, but a recurring theme in his writing on the Court has been the need to make
public service a practical and attractive option for nonlawyers.
38 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
39 Id. at 322. Immunity can also be lost if the official "took the action with the malicious
intention to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights or other injury to the student." Id.
40 Id. at 329 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
41 Id. at 331.
42

448 U.S. 1 (1980).

43 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1974).
44 448 U.S. at 11 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
45 Id. at 33.
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that the resulting harrassment of local officials 46 would so denigrate their jobs as to leave no room for meaningful participation.
In his concurrence in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,-7 Justice Powell, for similar reasons, counseled against the expansive use of federal habeas power to reverse state convictions. He described a federal system with strong and independent states as essential to the
diffusion of government power. 48 To ensure state strength, he
sought to preserve the dignity and the status of those individuals
who sit on state courts. Overuse of habeas review is harmful because it is humiliating: there is "nothing more subversive of a
judge's sense of responsibility, of the inner subjective conscientiousness which is so essential a part of the difficult and subtle art
of judging well, than an indiscriminate acceptance of the notion
that all the shots will always be called by someone else."' 9
Justice Powell's desire to limit federal judicial review is particularly strong when the action under challenge is not only local, but
also political. In those cases, concern for the strength of states and
the principle of separation of power, both fundamental to Powell's
jurisprudence, 50 combine to counsel restraint.
Justice Powell's concern for preserving local political processes is
evident in his opinion for the Court in Warth v. Seldin.5 1 In denying standing to minority individuals who had sought to challenge
an exclusionary local zoning practice, Powell noted that
zoning laws and their provisions, long considered essential to effec-

46

Id. at 23.

47 412 U.S. 218, 250 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring).
48 Id. at 263-64 n.20 (quoting Harlan, Thoughts At A Dedication: Keeping the Judicial

Function in Balance, 49 A.B.A. J. 943, 943-44 (1963)).
4, Id. at 264-65 (quoting Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for
State Prisoners, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 441, 451 (1963)).
50 For opinions on the separation of power, see, e.g., Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 251
(1979) (Powell, J., dissenting); Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26
(1976); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 188-91 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring).
Whenever possible, Powell believes, hard choices should be made through the political process, because of its greater sensitivity to the needs and values of citizens. Even when Congress would prefer to leave decisionmaking to the courts, "[i]t does not follow. . .that this
Court is obliged to indulge Congress in its refusal to confront these hard questions." Cannon
v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. at 743 n.14 (Powell, J., dissenting). Because an individual's influence is probably greater at the state and local level, and because differences best
may be expressed and accommodated there, the value of having disputes resolved in a local
political forum is even greater than when the powers to be separated are both national.
5,422 U.S. 490 (1975).
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tive urban planning, are peculiarly within the province of state and
local legislative authorities. They are, of course, subject to judicial
review in a proper case. But citizens dissatisfied with provisions of
such laws should not overlook the availability of the normal democratic processes.2
Perhaps the most dramatic illustration of Justice Powell's insistence that important questions be resolved through local politics is
the opinion in Gregg v. Georgia,5 3 coauthored by Justices Stewart,
Powell, and Stevens. In a section that draws heavily on Powell's
earlier dissent in Furman v. Georgia,5 Gregg rejects the argument
that capital punishment is, under all conditions, a violation of the
eighth amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment. In
Furman, the Court had concluded that the death penalty was unconstitutional as applied, but had left open the question whether
the eighth amendment absolutely prohibited the sanction. In
Gregg, the Court held that on this issue "the constitutional test is
intertwined with an assessment of contemporary standards and the
legislative judgment weighs heavily in ascertaining such standards."5 5 Consequently, the Court emphasized the fact that a significant number of states had, since Furman, enacted statutes permitting capital punishment; the Court read this to indicate that "a
large proportion of American society continues to regard it as an
appropriate and necessary criminal sanction.!" In considering the
further question whether the punishment had a valid penological
justification, the three Justices found sufficient justification in the
community's need to express its moral outrage.5 7 And the hotly debated issue whether capital punishment has a deterrent effect was
left to state legislators, who could evaluate the statistical evidence
"in terms of their own local conditions and with a flexibility of ap52 Id. at 508 n.18. The standing decision was also based on the Court's conclusion that the
petitioners had failed to demonstrate that they had suffered personal harm from the challenged practices. Id. at 509. See notes 103-06 infra and accompanying text.
In Ingraham,see notes 15-18 supra and accompanying text, Powell deferred to local political processes when he held that a state's common-law remedies provided adequate due process protection against a local institution-here a public school-that was "open" to public
surveillance. 430 U.S; at 670.
" 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell & Stevens, JJ.).
408 U.S. 238, 414 (1972) (Powell, J., dissenting).
428 U.S. at 175 (opinion of Stewart, Powell & Stevens, JJ.).
'6

Id. at 179.

Id. at 183-84.
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proach that is not available to the courts. ' 58 In sum, the opinion
rejected a flat constitutional prohibition because the Justices preferred to defer to "the ability of a legislature to evaluate, in terms
of its particular State, the moral consensus concerning the death
penalty and its social utility as a sanction." 59 When the constitutional issue is so closely tied to moral questions, the Justices
thought it especially important that "the people [be permitted] to
express their preference through the normal democratic
processes." 60
III. THE JuDiciA
A.

ROLE

Limits of Knowledge and Competence

Closely related to Justice Powell's concern for community autonomy are his views about a judge's proper role. He believes that
judges, whether state or federal, appellate or trial, should proceed
with great caution when the cases before them raise the potential
of disrupting communities or institutions.
At one level, Powell's judicial caution simply reflects a widely
held view of the place of an independent judiciary in a democratic
society: judges are best equipped to protect individuals who assert
quite specific claims to relief, but should defer to more democratically based branches of the government when other sorts of disputes are involved. In other words, the judiciary can and must protect minorities against specific abuses of government power, but it
is incompetent to police official conduct generally through broad
rules designed to vindicate the interests of groups or classes of individuals. These are arguments that Powell frequently makes, 6 1
and they are related to the argument, elaborated above, that lower
levels of government should be preserved as arenas of individual
influence.
There is yet another argument for judicial restraint that may be,
to Powell, even more compelling than claims derived from democratic theory: if it is true that community bonds provide an essential avenue for individual fulfillment, it is important that judges
"
"

Id. at 186.

Id. at 186-87.
e' Id. at 176.
See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. at 500; United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166,
188, 192 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring).
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not compel all communities to fit the same mold. Justice should be
specific to avoid unnecessary disruption. Destruction of social order, of the various contexts in which each person makes his own
life is, Justice Powell appears to believe, itself a significant threat
to human freedom. The social order should not be endangered by
ill-considered efforts to restructure power with expansive judicial
rules drafted to redress what often may be merely a temporary or
minor abuse of government power.
There is an epistemological aspect to this argument. Because
communities are composed of individuals, and individuals vary,
communities can be understood only by focusing on specific circumstances. Powell is suspicious of advocates and judges who propose simple and far-reaching solutions. A solution that responds to
abstract matters of principle and policy and ignores the specific
may destroy communities and traditions that have been imperfectly understood. It may choose too quickly to sacrifice fairness to
individuals for loyalty to principle, and judicial solutions are not
undone easily when the reasoning behind them proves flawed.
Often a judge will never know whether his solution has worked,
and he will seldom be able to count its costs. Caution, therefore, is
justified by the limits of judicial competence and by the special
susceptibility of judges to overlook the limits of human knowledge
about complex organizations.
Powell's distrust of abstract questions and all-inclusive answers
has been apparent from his first days on the Court. 2 One of his
most explicit statements of such distrust can be found in his dissent in Furman v. Georgia,6 s where he first rejected a conclusive
condemnation of capital punishment. Petitioners in Furman argued that the death penalty-in all its forms and however administered-violates the constitutional ban on cruel and unusual punishment." This argument, Powell wrote, "goes far beyond the
traditional process of case-by-case inclusion and exclusion."6 5 Peti-

62

See, e.g., Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. at 241-52 (Powell, J., concurring in part

and dissenting in part).
62 408 U.S. at 414 (Powell, J., dissenting).
Although only two Justices called for the abolition of all capital punishment, Justice
Powell found "unpersuasive" the reasoning of the Justices who called for some "less-thanabsolute-abolition." Id. at 415-16. Thus, he determined to focus only upon the broader rules
urged by the petitioners. Id. at 416.
65 Id. at 430.

HeinOnline -- 68 Va. L. Rev. 316 1982

1982]

Individual and Community

317

tioners sought "a precipitate and final judicial end."66 Their argument was not limited to the application of the death penalty in the
case before the Court, but assumed "that the ultimate wisdom as
to the appropriateness of capital punishment under all circumstances, and for all future generations, has somehow been revealed. '67 Powell would be more receptive to an equal protection
argument based on statistical proof by a particular defendant that
he had received a sanction more severe than that received by
others not of his race for the same crime.68 Powell also rejected an
across-the-board rule that capital sanctions are inappropriate for
the crime of rape: "Although this case-by-case approach may seem
painfully slow and inadequate to those who wish the Court to assume an activist legislative role in reforming criminal punishments,
it is the approach dictated both by our prior opinions and by a due
recognition of the limitations of judicial power." 6 '
As these quotations suggest, the nondemocratic nature of judicial review was one reason for Powell's reluctance to act: "In a democracy the first indicator of the public's attitude must always be
found in the legislative judgments of the people's chosen representatives. 70 The majority's "sweeping" decision that the imposition of capital punishment in the cases before the Court violated
the Constitution "reflects a basic lack of faith and confidence in
the democratic process. '7 1 But also critical was the abstract nature
of such a broad decision: "The sobering disadvantage of constitutional adjudication of this magnitude is the universality and permanence of the judgment. The enduring merit of legislative action
is its responsiveness to the democratic process, and to revision and
1171
change ....
Abstractions limit judicial understanding even when judges deal
in remedies rather than in abstract prohibitions. Before ruling,
Powell believes, a judge should be as fully aware as possible of the
actual practical constraints on the people in the particular institutions that will be required to respond to his orders. Otherwise, he

,4Id.
67 Id. at 431.
68 Id. at 449.
" Id. at 461.
70 Id. at 436-37.
71

Id. at 464-65.
at 462.

72 Id.
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cannot predict the consequences of his actions. In his own opinions, Justice Powell has repeatedly tried to identify the kinds of
institutional pressures that may exist. In doing this, he has not
claimed that the constraints that he articulates exist in all organizations. Instead, he has tried to describe the kinds of factors that
should counsel restraint or that trial judges should elucidate in the
course of litigation. He fears that judges will be tempted to conceal
their lack of knowledge by ignoring and downplaying potential
costs.
This may be most likely to happen when those costs are
financial. In Keyes, as we have seen, Justice Powell was concerned
that a constitutional busing requirement would place serious economic burdens on school districts already short of funds.7 - In Cannon v. University of Chicago, where Powell dissented from the majority's conclusion that a private cause of action can be implied
under title IX, he again counseled against imposing financial burdens on educational institutions.7" Despite the weaknesses of the
rejected applicant's case, he argued, "these schools have been
forced to use their scarce resources to defend against this suit,"7 5
and "It]he burden of expensive, vexatious litigation upon institutions whose resources often are severely limited may well compel"
institutions to develop more objective admissions criteria, criteria
that are less educationally useful but more easily defended in the
courtroom. 7 6 Similarly, in Mathews v. Eldridge,7 Justice Powell
warned that requiring additional procedural safeguards before the
suspension of Social Security benefits would entail costs in terms
of money and administrative time, costs that "may in the end
come out of the pockets of the deserving since resources available
7' 8
for any particular program of social welfare are not unlimited.
In addition to financial consequences, Justice Powell has addressed the less tangible effects that court decisions may have on
institutional life. In Cannon, he was troubled that the response of
the Court to the "abstract" merits of a (probably unwinnable)

"' 413 U.S. at 248 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See notes 7-9
supra and accompanying text.
441 U.S. at 730 (Powell, J,, dissenting).

Id. at 748 n.19.
7 Id. at 747 (footnote omitted).
77 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
78 Id. at 348.
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claim of gender discrimination would push educational institutions
to adopt a less personal approach to their own participants.7 9 In
Keyes, he warned that judicial oversight of routine administrative
decisions may cripple the functioning of institutions and deaden
the spirits of officials." In Ingraham v. Wright,81 he mentioned the
importance of preserving "the teacher's ability to maintain discipline in the classroom" 82 and counted the fact that teachers may
not themselves be free to decide whether to use corporal punishment to that end as a cost to be weighed in evaluating the requirements of procedural due process.83 He also pointed out, in an insight that cuts across the normal assumptions of public interest
litigation, that the formalization of school disciplinary proceedings
actually may harm children subject to sanctions by increasing their
84

anxiety.

Finally, Justice Powell has been attentive to the personal costs
to other members of a community that may result from judicial
efforts to remedy injuries to complainants. For example, in Wood
v. Strickland, he dissented from the majority's conclusion that
state and local officials can be held liable when they violate settled
constitutional rights.85 This is asking too much of nonlawyers,
Powell argued. And he persistently challenges judicial remedies for
discrimination that impose burdens not only on the wrongdoers,
but also on "innocent third parties." '
B. The Ends of Litigation
Justice Powell's efforts to limit the role of the federal judiciary
follow naturally from his awareness of the dangers of over-ambitious judicial rulemaking. Not only does a federal judicial decision
inevitably intrude on the authority of the states, but federal
judges, being farther removed from the practical consequences of
their decisions, are more likely than state judges to adopt abstract
11 See

note 76 supra and accompanying text.
80 413 U.S. at 232-35 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
81 430 U.S. 651 (1977). See notes 15-17 supra and accompanying text.
81 430 U.S. at 681 n.50.
83 Id. at 680-81.
1, Id. at 681 n.51.
85 See notes 38-41 supra and accompanying text.

88 See Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. at 789 (Powell, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). See also notes 28-30 supra and accompanying text.
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sufficient regard

for

consequences.
A central principle upon which Justice Powell relies in restricting the federal judicial role is that the primary responsibility of
any judge-state or federal-is to respond to personal claims of
injury or specific requests for relief, rather than to serve as a general supervisor of official conduct. This theme is most evident in
two areas about which Justice Powell has demonstrated the most
enduring concern-habeas corpus and justiciability. In both of
these areas, Justice Powell's focus on personal claims of injury has
led him to restrict the kinds of claims that will be heard by a federal court.
In a series of opinions, Powell has elaborated upon the view that
federal habeas should be reserved for relief to the innocent individual who has been erroneously incarcerated. He argued in his concurrence in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte that federal habeas has
been extended inappropriately beyond its historic bounds "not to
further justice on behalf of arguably innocent persons but all too
often to serve mechanistic rules quite unrelated to justice in a particular case."' 87 In Stone v. Powell,8 8 Justice Powell, for the Court,
held that a state prisoner who had an opportunity to litigate a
fourth amendment exclusionary rule claim in state court could not
raise it in federal habeas. He pointed out that even when the exclusionary rule is used during the trial of the accused in state court
it has significant costs,8 9 for it diverts attention "from the ultimate
question of guilt or innocence that should be the central concern in
a criminal proceeding." 90 These costs may be justified at trial and
on direct appeal, 91 but they are intolerable when combined with
the costs of federal collateral review.9 2 In the federal forum, ' at
' 93
least, the issue should be "the basic justice of. . .incarceration.
Concurring in the judgment in Rose v. Mitchell," Powell con87 412 U.S. at 259 (Powell, J., concurring).

428 U.S. 465 (1976).
89 Id. at 489 & n.27.
9" Id. at 490.
91 Id. at 492. Powell is not convinced that even at the trial level, the exclusionary rule is
worth its costs, see id. at 492 & n.32, but for purposes of this case, he assumed that it is, see
id. at 492-93.
:2 See id. at 491 & n.31.
3 See id.
" 443 U.S. 545 (1979).
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tended that claims of discrimination in the selection of a grand
jury also should not be heard in federal habeas.9 5 Preventing discrimination is important, but "[h]abeas corpus is not a general
writ meant to promote the social good or vindicate all societal interests of even the highest priority."9' Rather, it was "developed by
the law to serve [the] precise and particular purpose"
of protecting
7
an innocent claimant from unjust incarceration.
Justice Powell's insistence that the federal courts not be used to
vindicate group grievances comes through even more clearly in his
opinions on justiciability. As early as his concurrence in United
States v. Richardson,9" he described the core issue in taxpayer or
citizen standing cases as whether "federal courts should entertain
public actions"9 9 and answered in the negative. 100 His answer was
based in part on his belief that courts who exercise power "as indiscriminately as is now being urged" 10 1 risk retaliation by the rep95Id. at 579 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment).
" Id. at 586 (emphasis in original).
97 Id.
:8 418 U.S. 166, 180 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring).
9 Id. at 186.
100 Id. at 196.
,01Id. at 191. Justice Powell's determination to limit the role of the federal courts in

policing government conduct explains his hostility to efforts to "make a federal case" out of
an issue that could be resolved by other means. In Warth, for instance, Powell described one
plaintiff group's federal claim as little "'more than an [ingenious academic] exercise in the
conceivable.'" 422 U.S. at 509 (quoting United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 688 (1973)).
Powell does recognize that the federal courts themselves are primarily responsible for encouraging lawyers to cast their cases in a form that will support federal litigation. Not only
have they heard claims despite the plaintiff's apparent lack of standing, see, e.g., Deposit
Guar. Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 353 n.13 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting), but they
also have found constitutional violations that, in Powell's view, do not reflect actual injuries.
Dissenting in Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977), Powell described his "sense of unreality when Justices here in Washington decide solely on the basis of inferences from statistics that the Mexican-Americans who control the levers of power in this remote border
country are manipulating them to discriminate 'against themselves."' Id. at 518 (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
Against this background, Powell's hostility to doctrinal developments that encourage artful pleadings or inflated claims may be better understood. This appears to be one reason for
his refusal in Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978), to hold that a violation of procedural
due process automatically entitles a plaintiff to recover substantial damages under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (1976). More explicitly, in Rose v. Mitchell, he argued against expansive interpretations of the scope of federal habeas on the ground that it encourages lawyers to raise
"[flederal constitutional challenges ... in almost every state criminal case." 443 U.S. at 581
(Powell, J., concurring in the judgment). See also Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. at 11-12, 22,
33 (Powell, J., dissenting); Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 645
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resentative branches and in part on his view that federal courts
will be most effective if their limited resources are not diverted
from "their historic role" of protecting individuals and minority
groups against oppression and discrimination to "some102amorphous
general supervision of the operations of government.2

Justice Powell pressed this view on behalf of a majority of the
Court in the remarkably harsh opinion of Warth v. Seldin,103
where standing was denied to a wide range of litigants who had
hoped to challenge a town's zoning practices. There Powell articulated what has become his standard approach to standing cases:
the Constitution imposes an absolute minimum requirement that a
personal stake in the outcome of litigation be shown by the plaintiff before the case can be called justiciable. 110 And judicial prudence imposes additional requirements to bar assertion of "public"
claims even by those who can establish an individual stake. Because of these "prudential" limitations, no generalized grievance
will be heard, and claims of third parties cannot be asserted.105
"Without such limitations," Justice Powell noted, "the courts
(1979) (Powell, J., concurring); Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 551 (1974) (Powell, J., dissenting) (the majority's approach to pendent jurisdiction "would broaden federal question
jurisdiction to encompass matters of state law whenever an imaginative litigant can think up
a federal claim, no matter how insubstantial, that is related to the transaction giving rise to
the state claim").
102 418 U.S. at 192 (Powell, J., concurring).
103 422 U.S. 490 (1975). Discussed at notes 51-52 supra and accompanying text.
104 The individual petitioners in Warth were denied standing as persons of low or moderate income because they failed to demonstrate that "absent the respondents' restrictive zoning practices, there is a substantial probability that they would fiave been able to purchase a
lease in Penfield and that, if the court affords the relief requested, the asserted inability of
petitioners will be removed." 422 U.S. at 504. Despite evidence in the record of two housing
projects that were denied zoning approval, Justice Powell noted that "[tjhere is. . . not the
slightest suggestion that they would [have been] adequate, and of sufficiently low cost, to
meet these petitioners' needs." Id. at 505-06 n.15.
In contrast, in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S.
252 (1977), Justice Powell, writing for the Court, held that a minority plaintiff had standing
to allege race discrimination in local zoning because he could point to a particular housing
project, contemplated by another plaintiff, into which he would move if the zoning barrier
were removed. Because there was "at least a 'substantial probability'" that the project
would materialize, the plaintiff's claim was "not dependent on speculation about the possible actions of third parties not before the court." Id. at 264 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422
U.S. at 504).
21 Some petitioners in Warth were denied standing as taxpayers because, even assuming
that they could demonstrate personal harm, prudential concerns barred them from asserting
the rights of the third parties excluded from Penfield. 422 U.S. at 509.

HeinOnline -- 68 Va. L. Rev. 322 1982

1982]

Individual and Community

would be called upon to decide abstract questions of wide public
significance even though other governmental institutions may be
more competent to address the questions and even though judicial
intervention may be unnecessary to protect individual rights."'1 6
The following year, in Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare
Rights Organization,17 Justice Powell, again for the Court, refused
to find that the constitutionally required "personal stake" existed
in a challenge to an Internal Revenue Service ruling that removed
certain incentives for treatment of indigents by hospitals. Justice
Powell held that in order to demonstrate their personal stake, the
indigents must demonstrate not only that they "had been injured
in fact" by the ruling, but also that the injury "is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision" by the Court.108 Powell was unwilling to speculate on the motivations behind the hospitals' denial
of care, and he refused to generalize about hospital behavior because he felt that the response to any change in the ruling would
vary from institution to institution.10 9
Powell's insistence that a judge is limited to redressing individual grievances also is decisive in the disposition of cases that are
properly before him. He insists that relief be as specific as possible.
0 where he rejected the arguFor example, in Carey v. Piphus,"1
ment that compensable injury may be presumed to flow from every
denial of due process, Powell stressed that compensation for personal injury is the goal of tort litigation. "Rights, constitutional
and otherwise, do not exist in a vacuum. Their purpose is to protect persons from injuries to particular interests, and their contours are shaped by the interests they protect."'' In Estes v. Metropolitan Branches of the Dallas NAACP,'
another case
involving the appropriateness of busing to achieve racial balance in
public schools, Powell dissented from dismissal of the writ of certiorari in an opinion that insisted that the courts cannot achieve and
should not attempt to achieve perfectly integrated school sys106

Id. at 500. See also Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 131 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring

in part and dissenting in part).
107 426 U.S. 26 (1976).
108 Id. at 38.
,09 Id. at 43.
110 435 U.S. 247 (1978).
111 Id. at 254.
11, 444 U.S. 437 (1980) (per curiam).
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tems. 113 Nor should they "'embrace all the problems of racial
prejudice.' ",114 Instead, the goal of relief in a school desegregation
case, as in other litigation, is simply to restore the victims of discrimination to the positions they would have been in had there
been no violation.11 5
Justice Powell's insistence that judges are to provide redress
only for individual injuries that can be traced directly to a violation of the law leads him to conclude that it is inappropriate for
judges to attempt to cure the injustices caused by economic inequities or disparities in social status. Judges should not try to effect
such cures because they have special competence only in the particular and because they cannot sufficiently control the consequences of their decisions. In refusing to join the majority in
8 Powell conceded that capital punishment falls disproFurman,""
portionately on the poor, but that problem, he felt, could not be
attributed to the only legal question in the case-a challenge to the
severity of the penalties for crime. Rather, the disproportionate
burden was due to "social and economic factors that have plagued
humanity since the beginning of recorded history, frustrating all
efforts to create in any country at any time the perfect society in
which there are no 'poor,' no 'minorities' and no 'underprivileged.' "1117 These are causes, he went on to say, that "are unrelated
to the constitutional issue [of cruel and unusual punishment]
before the Court."""" Again in Warth,11 9 Justice Powell refused to
find standing where "petitioners' descriptions of their individual
financial situations and housing needs suggest.., that their inability to reside in Penfield is the consequence of the economics of
the area housing market, rather than of respondents' assertedly il1 20
legal acts.
Justice Powell is not indifferent to the needs of those who suffer

"I Id. at 438 (Powell, J., dissenting).
Id. at 447 (quoting Swan v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 23
(1971)).
Id. (citing Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 280 (1977)).
"I
For a discussion of Justice Powell's dissent in Furman, see notes 63-67 supra and accompanying text.
114

21

1

408 U.S. at 447 (Powell, J., dissenting).

Id. at 448.
For a discussion of Justice Powell's opinion in Warth, see notes 103-05 supra and
accompanying text.
"9

120

422 U.S. at 506.
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because of their social and economic status,1"21 but he is convinced
that such injuries are "usually beyond judicial correction." 12 2 Also,
a court that engages in social engineering risks affecting communities in ways beyond the judge's awareness and control. This theme
has its roots in Keyes,12 3 and Powell also stressed it in his refusal
to restructure school financing
in San Antonio Independent
24
Rodriquez:
v.
District
School
There is nothing simple or certain about predicting the consequences of massive change in the financing and control of public
education. Those who have devoted the most thoughtful attention
to the practical ramifications of these cases have found no clear or
dependable answers and their scholarship reflects no such unqualified confidence125 in the desirability of completely uprooting the existing system.

The answer, if there is one, must be discovered
through "the legis'12
'
lative processes of the various States.

8

A second consequence of Justice Powell's belief that the specific,
rather than the abstract, is the proper end of litigation is his inclination to balance the costs and benefits of a proposed course of
action. This technique, which is often frustrating to those who seek
certainty in the law, reflects Powell's view that no principle, even a
constitutional one, is so clear and so compelling that it can dictate
a rule that will determine results in all situations. When Powell
does dictate a result, it tends to be against judicial action; his inclination to balance does not mean that he has no consistent perspective. What he hopes to communicate is that judges should take
care to understand the consequences of their actions and should
reserve action when those consequences cannot fully be
understood.
Justice Powell's balancing approach is demonstrated most
See, e.g., Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1 (1978).
See Estes, 444 U.S. at 451 n.18 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell's entire dissent
in Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 479 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting), is a
forceful elaboration of this theme. He pointed out, for instance, that in numerous cities,
forced integration of public schools has resulted in a process of resegregation when families
have moved or resorted to private education. Id. at 484-85.
:2 413 U.S. at 250 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
24 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
:1

22

:26

Id. at 56.
at 58.

12 Id.
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clearly by his opinions concerning the exclusionary rule and the
scope of procedural due process requirements.1 27 In the exclusionary rule cases, beginning with his concurrence in Schneckloth,
Powell has urged the Court to take a "pragmatic" approach: "Our
decisions have not encouraged the thought that what may be an
appropriate constitutional policy in one context automatically becomes such for all times and all seasons. 1 128 Subsequently, in several opinions discouraging the use of the rule, he has weighed the
costs of exclusion against the gains to the goals that the rule
serves.12 9
Similarly, in the procedural due process cases, such as Mathews
a and Arnett v. Kennedy,1' 3 Powell has weighed the
v. Eldridge'"
private litigant's interest in avoiding a deprivation and the risk of
erroneous government action against the government or public interest in acting in the manner contested, including the interest in
minimizing expenses and increasing efficiency. 13 2 Most frequently,
Powell has determined that the government's interests outweigh
those of the private litigant,'3 3 but he has not been insensitive to
the needs of individuals faced with the deprivation of government
127 It is, however, an approach that Justice Powell finds congenial, and he has used it in a
wide range of situations. It appears in opinions that address problems ranging from such
quasi-constitutional issues as the prudential limitations on standing, e.g., Singleton v. Wulff,
428 U.S. 106, 122 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); United
States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 180 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring), and the preemptive
effect of the National Labor Relations Act, e.g., Farmer v. United Bhd. of Carpenters &
Joiners Local 25, 430 U.S. 290 (1977), to statutory issues, such as the interpretation of the
Clayton Act, e.g., Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186 (1974). Balancing is particularly common in Justice Powell's opinions concerning remedies for school segregation.
See, e.g., Estes v. Metropolitan Branches of the Dallas NAACP, 444 U.S. at 438 (Powell, J.,
dissenting); Columbus Bd.of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 479 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting); Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. at 217 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
128 412 U.S. at 270 (Powell, J., concurring).
129 See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (assertion on federal habeas corpus that
state court improperly admitted evidence seized in violation of the fourth amendment);
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974) (exclusion of questions based on unlawful
search and seizure). Cf. Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. at 579 (Powell, J., concurring in the
judgment) (assertion on federal habeas corpus of claim of racial discrimination in selection
of state grand jury foreman).
130 424 U.S. 319 (1976). See notes 77-78 supra and accompanying text.
1" 416 U.S. 134, 164 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the result in
part). See also Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
132 See, e.g., 424 U.S. at 335; 416 U.S. at 164.
...See cases cited in notes 130-31 supra.
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services "essential to health and safety."' '
In its effort to avoid disruptively broad solutions, Justice Powell's jurisprudence leaves much authority to others-to federal trial
judges, who are more sensitive to and informed about the needs of
the private parties before the court than is the Supreme Court,13 5
and to state officials at all levels of responsibility, whom he would
leave relatively free from constitutional restraints.
This deference is deliberate and explicit. Powell insists that officials other than those who sit on the Supreme Court must be
trusted to provide fair treatment to citizens. The Supreme Court,
even with the aid of the lower federal courts, simply is not institutionally able to oversee all other government officials. Even if it
could perform this task, such supervision would destroy the sense
of responsibility that, when it is found in institutions and officials,
is the best guarantee of individual rights. Powell repeatedly insists
that these other officials are in fact trustworthy and deserve the
deference that he is willing to give them.
That state judges can be trusted to sanction violations of the
Constitution is a recurrent theme in Justice Powell's work. It is the
key to understanding his conclusion in Stone v. Powell that claims
based on the fourth amendment's exclusionary rule will not be
heard in federal habeas. 136 Habeas review can be considered a re-

dundant and unnecessary remedy for constitutional claims only if
state judges will give those claims serious attention when they are
raised initially. In a footnote to the Stone opinion, Justice Powell
said:
The policy arguments that respondents marshal in support of the
view that federal habeas corpus review is necessary to effectuate
the Fourth Amendment stem from a basic mistrust of the state
courts as fair and competent forums for the adjudication of federal
constitutional rights. The argument is that state courts cannot be
trusted to effectuate Fourth Amendment values through fair application of the rule, and the oversight jurisdiction of this Court on
certiorari is an inadequate safeguard .... Despite differences in

institutional environment and the unsympathetic attitude to fedSee, e.g., Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 14 n.15 (1978).
135In devising remedies for constitutional wrongs such as school segregation, trial judges

can "consider many economic, social, and educational factors. . . factors [that] vary widely
from community to community." Estes, 444 U.S. at 444 (Powell, J., dissenting).
" See notes 88-93 supra and accompanying text.
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eral constitutional claims of some state judges in years past, we are
unwilling to assume that there now exists a general lack of appropriate sensitivity to constitutional
rights in the trial and appellate
13 7
courts of the several States.
Earlier, in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, Justice Powell had argued
that "the asserted inadequacy of state procedures and unsympathetic attitude of state judges are far less realistic grounds of concern than in years past."' 18
Powell places similar trust in nonjudicial officers. He reminded
us in Goss v. Lopez that "[w]e have relied for generations upon the
experience, good faith and dedication of those who staff our public
schools," 13 9 and in Mathews v. Eldridge,he insisted that "substantial weight must be given to the good-faith judgments of the individuals charged by Congress with the administration of social welfare programs that the procedures they have provided 1 assure
fair
40
consideration of the entitlement claims of individuals."
To fail to trust state officials, Powell fears, is to make them untrustworthy, for human beings can be expected to perform well
only if given responsibility and respect.1 41 To give up on lowerlevel officials is to give up on the ideal of responsive government,
for responsive government requires attention to the particular
claims of individual citizens, a task that can be performed only
randomly by national officers. We must depend, in most cases, on
local officials, who are in a better position, in terms of both time
and knowledge, to assume the responsibility of mastering the de137 428 U.S. at 493-94 n.35.

38 412 U.S. at 259 n.13 (Powell, J., concurring). See also Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420
U.S. 738 (1975), where Justice Powell noted:
The precise content of constitutional rights almost invariably turns on the context of
fact and law in which they arise. State courts are quite as capable as federal courts of
determining the facts, and they alone can define and interpret state law. Equally important, under Art. VI of the Constitution, state courts share with federal courts an
equivalent responsibility for the enforcement of federal rights, a responsibility one
must expect they will fulfill.
Id. at 755-56. Deciding in that opinion against intervention in impending military courtmartial proceedings, Justice Powell also expressed his trust "that the military court system
will vindicate servicemen's constitutional rights." Id. at 758.
23 419 U.S. at 595 (Powell, J., dissenting). See also Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke,
438 U.S. at 318-19 (opinion of Powell, J.); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. at 681-82; Keyes v.
School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. at 217 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
140

424 U.S. at 349.

141

See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 265 (Powell, J., concurring).
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tails of each claim. The Supreme Court's task is to ensure the existence of conditions that nurture this responsibility.
IV.

SoME REFLECTIONS

In his tenure on the Supreme Court, Justice Powell has sought
to protect and nurture local government and community institutions, and he has urged federal judicial restraint in disturbing
traditional bonds. Justice Powell, however, has not always adhered
to the principles that he has developed. For example, despite his
persistent claims that moral issues must be left to community resolution, he has cooperated with his Brethren in taking from the
states control over a woman's decision to bear children and over
classifications made on the basis of sex."4 He acknowledges by this
that there are situations in which tradition and community become
oppressive.
A more troubling departure, at least for me, is Justice Powell's
opinion in First National Bank v. Bellotti,14 in which he developed a flat constitutional rule that prohibits local communities
from imposing limitations on corporate spending designed to influence the outcome of public referenda. Powell's more typical insistence that local officials best understand local conditions was forgotten here; his common assertion that judges cannot correct
injuries created by disparities in status or wealth, an argument
that usually cuts against judicial action, was turned into a justification for his refusal to listen to community fears that corporate resources may be so great as to distort the referendum process."'
Other criticisms can be made-more serious because they are
not the result of inconsistency, but rather point to problems inherent in the judicial philosophy that I have described. The first of
these is relatively minor. An individual-centered jurisprudence requires that decisions be made about who is to count as an individual. Justice Powell can be accused of refusing to accord full respect
to the interests of, for example, children,14 5 criminals subject to the

"I'See

Sandalow, Federalism and Social Change, 43 Law & Contemp. Probs. 29, 34, 37

(Summer 1980).
143 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
144 Id. at 789-90.
'45 See, e.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (plurality opinion). In Baird, however,

Powell at least recognized that a child's privacy right should not be subject to an absolute
parental veto. See also Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651; Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. at 584
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sanction of death, 4 " and fetuses, 47 although the relevant rulings
are consistent with his concern for traditional community values.
This is a less telling criticism than it would be were Justice Powell's emphasis on the individual purely rights-oriented. Were that
the case, he would be required to articulate exactly how conflicting
claims between autonomous and equally worthy creatures could be
reconciled. The problem of reconciliation is less troublesome in
light of Powell's focus on community, for conflicting claims can be
evaluated by reference to roles and relationships defined by the
community rather than by the judge. 48
A second, and more difficult, problem arises out of Justice Powell's inclination to resolve questions by balancing the factors that
he considers relevant. This is a technique that appeals to Justice
Powell because it is attentive to variety and avoids the arrogance
of less flexible decisions. In practice, however, the balancing technique may encourage judges to play a more intrusive role. Instead
of enforcing a defined and limited set of minimum regulations, the
judge is encouraged to become an expert in the practical problems
involved in a particular dispute. The temptation is great to take
the next step and become a judicial "bureaucrat," devising compromise solutions that respond to a wide range of concerns beyond
those properly before the court. Powell's own jurisprudence, to this
extent, carries within it the seeds of "public interest" litigation
that he elsewhere is at such pains to discourage.
A third problem inherent in Justice Powell's views is that his
willingness to trust other officials and to limit federal judicial supervision of their conduct ignores the basic distrust implicit in the
Constitution's diffusion of authority. Perhaps this is unavoidable.
The tension deliberately incorporated into the federal structure
makes neither trust nor distrust a completely appropriate re(Powell, J., dissenting).
146 See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (opinion of Stewart, Powell & Stevens, JJ.);
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 414 (Powell, J., dissenting).
147 See, e.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (plurality opinion).
'4' A related problem, and one that may pose more difficulties for Justice Powell, is
whether it is appropriate to distinguish among institutions and communities. Justice Powell
often draws the line in terms of the historical and traditional roots of the organization. See
note 14 supra and accompanying text. He seems to have found it more difficult to understand the claims of certain organizations-for instance, those of labor unions, see, e.g., Connell Const. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 100, 421 U.S. 616 (1975), or of dissident
movements, see, e.g., Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
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sponse. A permanently unstable mixture of the two may be all that
is possible, and Justice Powell may believe that an emphasis on
trust is an appropriate corrective to the decisions of the Warren
Court years. 14 9 But his approach may appear callous to litigants
who lack his confidence in the good faith of other officials.
Finally, Powell's jurisprudence also may seem callous in that it
appears to ignore limitations on the ability of many individuals to
play an active public role. In other words, Powell may overestimate
the availability of alternatives to constitutional litigation in federal
courts. 150 Powell's vision of democracy, which has a markedly Jeffersonian cast, downplays the fact that, because of the accumulation of financial resources and a trend toward centralization that
goes far beyond the decisions of the Warren Court, institutions,
both private and governmental, may have a power in society much
greater than that of the individuals who play institutional roles.15 1
Justice Powell's response might be that, if this is the case, it creates an inequity that courts cannot redress without risking the indiscriminate destruction of the social context in which these powers have flourished. This is a cost that he views as too great, for it
would leave the individual in a vacuum, perhaps vindicated in asserting his rights but without a community in which to exercise
them. Far better, Justice Powell might say, for the courts to preserve existing frameworks and to exercise their authority by reminding those in power of their obligations.
CONCLUSION
Over the last decade, Justice Powell has followed a jurisprudence

1,9 See text accompanying notes 137-38 supra.
150 See, e.g., Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. at 583 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment).
There Powell argues that discrimination in the selection of grand juries may be attacked
through federal criminal sanctions and through private actions brought by those improperly
excluded from jury service. Id. at 583 n.5. Neither of these suggestions is likely to be particularly reassuring to defendants. In addition, Justice Powell asserts that review is available
by the Supreme Court on direct appeal from a conviction. Id. Again, success in obtaining a
reversal through that route is remote for any given defendant, and Justice Powell subsequently questions whether even this amount of federal judicial involvement is appropriate.
Id. at 587 n.9.
5 This may explain his unusual willingness to adopt a broad constitutional rule in First
Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti. See text accompanying notes 143-44 supra. The rule seems less intrusive if one has confidence in the ability of individuals and other, less wealthy organizations
to influence political decisionmaking.
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that encourages the assumption of responsibility as well as the assertion of rights. He has done this by focusing on the individual
citizen, as others have done, but he emphasizes that the individual
finds his greatest happiness in a community and can best exercise
power within that context, rather than in opposition to others. For
Powell, the state or the municipality should be preserved with as
much strength as possible, for local government can be a forum in
which people can exercise power over their lives. Nongovernment
institutions-the family, even the private corporation-also can
play this role and should be encouraged to do so.
There are important corollaries to this theme. First, outsiders,
such as judges, should be reluctant to take steps that may threaten
institutional balance. When such steps are unavoidable, they
should be undertaken with attention to the unique relationships
that make up each structure, and generalizations, which obscure
understanding, should be avoided. Second, Justice Powell reminds
us that institutions, and most particularly the government, are
themselves composed of individuals. To woodenly favor the individual over the institution may deprive the individual of the
framework in which he would best flourish.
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